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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3649 
S. J. OLIVER, Appellant, 
versus 
J. PRESTON HEWITT, HELEN H. ALEXANDER and 
W. H. BOYD and PAULINE H. HEWITT, Appellees. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeal$ of 
Virginia: 
Petitioner, (hereafter often called complainant), S. J. Oliver 
appellant, respectfully represents that he is aggrieved by a final 
decree in the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth, entered 
on the 10th day of March, 1949, in a chancery suit in which 
he was the complainant and J. Preston liewitt, Helen H. Alex-
ander, W. H. Boyd and Pauline H. Hewitt were defendants, 
now appellees (hereafter often called the defendants), which 
decree refused to grant an injunction against the defendants or 
any one of them, and which decree reads in part as follows: ''It 
further appearing that J. Preston llewitt and Helen H. Alex-
ander and Kenneth C. Alexander, her husband, by deed dated 
the 7th day of July, 1947, conveyed the same property to 
2* Pauline H. Hewitt, but there was no provision in *this deed 
limiting the sale of groceries or soft drinks on the property, 
as in the deed from Oliver and wife to J. Preston Hewitt, et al., 
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(above referred to) and the Court is of the opinion that since 
there is no provision or condition in the deed from J. Preston 
Hewitt, et als., to Pauline H. Hewitt, limiting the sale of groceries 
or soft drinks, the condition or covenant does not run with the 
land, but is a personal covenant and doth so decide." · 
A transcript of the record in said suit with the exliimts is here-
with filed, to which reference is made. 
The bill's (R., p. 4) charges briefly stated and including only 
the most important charges are: "That S. J. Oliver owned, 
operated and controlled a grocery store, selling groceries and soft 
drinks on Lincoln Street, Portsmouth, Virginia, on the 28th day 
of January, 1946, had been for many years prior thereto, ani still 
is the owner and operator of said grocery business and seller of 
soft drinks on Lincolµ Street, in this City; that belng owner of 
said grocery business and seller of soft drinks and the fee simple 
owner of thos.e certain lots situate in the City of Portsmouth, 
Virginia, known, numbered and designated as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 
in Block No. 30, on the plat of the Prentis Park Corporation, 
recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Norfolk 
County, Virginia, in Map Book 7, page 93, he refused to sell the 
said lots of land unless the intended purchasers would buy with .... 
the covenant and condition attached that the building there-
3 * on or to be erected upon said *lots would not be used in 
competition with his business and would. agree that a 
covenant or condition be included in the deed of bargain and sale 
~'that the said pa.rties of the second part (grantees), nor their 
assigns, shall sell in any building to be erected upon said lots 
any groceries or bottled drinks, except that bottled High Rock 
may be sold on said premises on any day after 6 o'clock P. M.'' 
That the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt and Helen ·H. Alex-
ander, being fully informed of the conditions under which your 
complainant would only sell, agreed to buy and did buy said 
property; with the following covenant and condition attached, 
and which .was inserted in the deed in the following words: "The 
above conveyance is made upon the conditions that the said 
parties of the second part nor their assigns, shall sell in any build-
ing to be erected upon said lots any groceries or bottled drinks, 
except that bottled High Rock may be sold on said premises on 
any day after six o'clock P. M.," as will fully appear from the 
deed from complainant to the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt and 
Helen H. Alexander, dated January 28, 1946, and recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of the Court of Hustings for the City of Ports-
mouth, Virginia, in Deed Book 156, page 497. -
That the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt and Helen H. A~ex-
ander, by their deed dated July 7, 1947, and recorded in the 
Clerk's Office of the Court of Hustings in Deed Book 176, page 
-120, conveyed the property herein described to Pauline H. 
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Hewitt; that the said Pauline H. Hewitt had knowledge of 
4 * said covenant and *condition before and at the time of re-
ceiving said deed. 
That the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt, Helen H. Alexander 
and Pauline H. Hewitt, have with the aid of and in conspiracy 
with W. H. Boyd, wilfully broken said covenant and condition, 
and they, under the style and trade name of Boyd's are selling 
in said building groceries from the early morning hours until 
- the late evening hours, and are selling all kinds of soft drinks 
from the early morni_ng hours, all during the day and before 
6 o'clock P. M., on every day, except Sundays; and has threat,-
ened to continue said sales in violation of said covenant and con-
dition in said deed of bargain -and sale from your complainant 
to the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander, 
and their assigns, Pauline H. Hewitt and W. H. Boyd. 
That the sale of groceries and s)ft drinks in vioJation of said 
covenant and condition in said deed, has done, is doing and will 
continue to do your complainant, irreparable' damages; and un-
fairly competing with your complainant in his said business,' 
. have taken a large amount of business from complainant ~lready 
and will continue to do so, unless restrained. . 
. The defendant, Pauline H. Hewitt, filed a bill of complaint 
in which she asks the Court to enter a declaratory decree de-
claring the beforementioned condition "null and void as being a 
personal covenant only, and not a covenant running with the 
land.'' 
The Court, on the 24th day of January, 1949, consolidated 
the two causes. 
The case was set for trial on the 9th day of February, 
5* *1949. Counsel for the defendants stated to the Court that 
the sole question was one of law, and that there was no need 
for any evidence. He stated that if the covenant was a personal 
covenant and did not run with the land, the injunction should 
be denied; that if it was a real cove~ant an injunction will lie. 
Counsel for the complainant agreed with him that the sole issue 
was a question of law and that no evidence was necessary and that 
the covenant was a personal covenant, but that if the defendant, 
Pauline H. Hewitt, took the property, having notice of the 
covenant, then equity would grant an injunction. 
The errors assigned are that the Circuit Court erred in (1) dis 
missing the bill of S. J. Oliver v. J. Preston Hewitt, et als., praying 
for an injunction; (2) in overruling the motion (R., p. 16) to per-
mit the complainant to introduce evidence before any decree be 
entered in this cause to, prove that · the defendants are selling 
groceries and soft drinks in violation of the aforementioned 
covenant; (3) that the decree is ambiguous, vague and uncertain 
in holding: "it further appearing that J. Preston Hewitt, Helen 
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H. Alexander and Kenneth C. Alexander, her husband, by deed 
dated July 7, 1947, conveyed the same property to Pauline H. 
Hewitt, but there was no provision in this deed limiting the sale 
of groceries or soft drinks on the property, as in the deed from 
Oliver and wife to J. Preston Hewitt, et al., (above referred to) 
and the Court is of the opinion that since there is no provision 
or condition in the deed from J. Preston Hewitt, et als., to Pauline 
H. Hewitt, limiting the sale of groceries or soft drinks, the 
6* condition or covenant does *not run with the land, but is 
a personal covenant and doth so decide." 
FACTS. 
That S. J. Oliver, who owns a grocery store at 1912 Lincoln 
Street, Portsmouth, Virginia, testified that he owns and operates 
a grocery store and had for some years. He testified that he 
owned lots Nos. 1 and 2 in Block 30, on the plat of the Prentis 
Park Corporation, which said land was located on the southwest 
intersection of Des Moines and Lincoln Streets; that he sold 
the said land on the 28th day of January, 1946, to J. Preston 
Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander. In the sale of this property to 
J. Preston Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander there was inserted 
this language: "The above conveyance is made upon the condi-
tion that said parties of the second part, nor their assigns, shall 
sell in any building to be erected upon said lots, any groceries 
or bottled drinks, except that bottled High Rock may be sold 
on said premises, on any day after six o'clock P. M." The deed 
conveying this property was offered as Exhibit "A. ' 
Mrs. Pauline H. Hewitt, who was put on the witness stand as 
an adverse witness for S. J. Oliver, testified that she purchased 
the above described property from J. Preston Hewitt and Helen 
Alexander by deed dated the 7th day of July, 1947, and that in 
the deed to her the above covenant was not inserted, and which 
said deed was offered and introduced in evidence by counsel for 
Mrs. Pauline H. Hewitt, and marked as defendant's "Exhibit 
No. 1." The evidence and pleadings disclosed that Pauline 
7 * H. Hewitt was *not the operator of said store and that same 
was leased to W. H. Boyd, and was employed at the Norfolk 
Navy Yard, and that she is the wife of J. Preston Hewitt. 
ARGUMENT. 
The circumstances and evidence in this case themselves make 
a strong argument for the complainant, S. J. Oliver. The com-
plainant has operated for many years for a livelihood a grocery 
store at 1912 Lincoln Street, Prentis Park, Portsmouth, Virginia 
He owned two lots near his grocery store, and sold them for a 
,--
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very reasonable price to the purchasers, J. Preston Hewitt and 
Helen H. AJexander, provided that they, nor their assigns, would 
sell groceries or soft drinks in a way so as to compete with him 
The purchasers, J. Preston Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander 
knew that the complainant would not have sold the property 
for the price he did if he was not to be protected in earning his 
livelihood of operating his grocery store. The deed expressly 
states in clear and simple language the following covenant: 
"The above conveyance is made upon the conditions that the 
said parties of the second part, nor their assigns, shall sell, in 
any building to be erected upon said lots ·any groceries or bottled 
soft drinks, except that bottled High Rock may be sold on said 
premises on any day after 6 o'clock P. M. '' This language is a 
restr.iction which is a legal personal covenant. 
In ?.tlison v. Greear, 188 Va. 64; 49 S. E. (2d) 279, the 11 
C t said in 14 Am. Juris. C, at the end of paragraph 205: 
8 * *" t. is clearly s~ated that, 'a co~enan t. personal to one. is 
termmated by his death or by hIS ceasmg to have an m-
terest in the property, his use of which is benefitted by the re-
striction." 
See also Jennings v. Baro ff, 144 A tl. 717. 
Your complainant, S. J. Oliver, is still living, and has for a 
number of years and still does operate a grocery store in the 
same locality in which is situated the property now owned by 
.the defendant; Pauline H. Hewitt, and leased to W. F. Boyd, 
on which groceries and soft drinks are beip.g sold in violation of 
the aforementioned covenant. 
Pauline H. Hewitt is the wife of J. Preston Hewitt, one of the 
grantees who purchased the property from the complainant, 
S. J. Oliver. The deed between the complainant and the de-
fendants, J. Preston Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander, dated Jan-
ary 28, 1946, and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Court of 
Hustings for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia, in Deed Book 
156, page 497, clearly stated the following covenant: "The above 
conveyance is made upon the conditions that the said parties 
of the second part, nor their assigns, shall sell, in any building 
to be erected upon said lots any groceries or bottled soft drinks, 
except that bottled High Rock may be sold on said premises on 
any day after 6 o'clock P. M.'' .. 
Approximately 18 months later J. Preston Hewitt and Helen 
H. Alexander transferred the property to J. Preston Hewitt's 
wife, Pauline H. Hewitt, by deed dated July 7, 1947, and 
9* recorded *in the Clerk's Office of the Court· of Hustings for 
the City of Portsmouth in Deed Book 176, page 120, and 
omitted the aforementioned covenant. It is patent that Pauline 
H. Hewitt took the property having express and constructive 
notice of the aforementioned restriction. -
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It is well sett.led that court of equity, irrespective of whetber 
a privity of estate exists or whether the covenant runs with the 
land upon equitable grounds enforce such covenants against 
purchasers with notice. In the case of Cheatham v. Taylor, 148 
Va. 26; 138 S. E. 545, the Court adopted the doctrine set forth 
in the celebrated case of Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, in which 
case the Lord Chancellor said: "That this court has jurisdiction 
to enforce a contract between the owner of land and his neighbor 
purchasing a part of it, that the latter shall either use or abstain 
from using the land purchased in a particular way, is what I 
never knew disputed. Here there is no question about the con-
tract; the owner of certain houses in the square sells the !and ad .. 
joining, with a covenant from the purchaser not to use it for any 
other purpose than as Square Garden. And it is now contended, 
not that the vendee could violate the contract, but that he might\.-
sell the piec(l of land, and that the purchaser from him may 
vialate it without this court hs.ving the power to iotecfere. If 
that were so, it would be impossible for an owner of land to sell 
part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains 
worthless. It is said that, the covenant being one which 
10* does not run with the land, this court *cannot enforce it; 
but the question is, not whether the covenant runs with 
the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land 
in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his 
vendor, and with notice of which he purchased. Of course the 
price would be affected by the covenant, and nothing could be 
more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able 
r'\ to sell the property the next day for a greater price, in considera-
,........_, tion of the assignee being allowed to escape from the liability 
~ which he had hirnself undertaken. 
"That the question does not depend upon whether the covenant ~ runs with the land is evident from this, that, if there was a mere 
agreement, and no covenant, this court would enforce it against 
a party purchasing with notice of it; for, if tw equity is attached ~ 
to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of ~ / that equity can stand in any different situation from the party 
\.~ from whom he purchased.'' 
See also Walters v. Smith, 186 Va. 173; 41 S. E. (2d) 617, 624; 
'CJ Cole v. m Va. 19· 104 S. E. 747. t'- ter rea ng the motion . , p. ma e y counsel for the 
complainant and the objection to said motion (R., p. 18) made 
by counsel for the defendant, Pauline H. Hewitt, it can readily 
be seen that it was not necessary for the complainant to put on 
evidence to show that the property which is the subject of this 
suit was being used in violation of the aforementioned covenant 
by selling groceries and soft drinks on said premises., for the 
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defendant · stated to the Court in his objection to said 
11 * motion: *"That counsel for Mr. Oliver had ample oppor-
tunity to introduce any evidence that he wished to at the 
time of the trial on February 9th, and readily agreed that the sole 
question of the case was one of law." Certainly this statement 
could mean but one thing, and that is that the fact that on the 
aforementioned property groceries and soft drinks are being sold, 
is admitted and not in issue, but the sole issue is one of law, and 
that is whether or not an injunction should be granted. The 
complainant was an:l still is able to prove that groceries and soft 
drinks are being sold on the said premises now owned by Pauline 
H. Hewitt. If there was any doubt in· the Court's mind that 
groceries and soft drinks were not being sold on said premises, 
then I respectfully submit that it should have heard evidence 
on this as it was not too late to introduce this evidence because 
no decree had been entered in this suit. The main purpose of 
equity is to do justice and not to take advantage of an error in 
judgment, if there was an error. It is well settled that before 
any decree becomes final, the Court has jurisdiction, and errors 
that would not prejudice the rights of the party may be corrected 
when in the discretion of the Court justice demandg it. I re-
spectfully submit that the Court abused its discretion by not 
sustaining the complainant's motion (R., p. 16). 
It is respectfully submitted that the decree of the Court is 
ambiguous, vague and uncertain in holding: "It further appear-
ing that J. Preston Hewitt, Helen H. Alexander and Kenneth 
C. Alexander, her husband, by deed dated July 7, 1947, 
conveyed the same property to Pauline H. Hewitt, but 
12 * there was *no provision in this deed limiting the sale of gro-
ceries or soft drinks on the property, as in the deed from 
Oliver and wife to J. Preston Hewitt, et al., (above referred to) 
and the Court is of the opinion that since there is no provision 
or condition in the deed from J. Preston Hewitt, et als., to Pauline 
H .. Hewitt, limiting the sale of groceries or soft drinks, the con-
dition or covenant does not run with the land, but is a personal 
covenant and doth so decide." 
If the Court meant to say that just because the aforementioned 
covenant was not in the deed conveying the property to Pauline 
H. Hewitt that this made the said covenant void and unenforce-
able against her and others having notice of said covenant, then 
I respectfully submit that this is a patent error. Cheatham v. 
v. Taylor, supra; ·Tulle v. Moxhay, supra; Cole v. Seamonds, 
supra; Walters v. Smith, supra. 
Petitioner prays that an appeal may be granted, the decree 
and proceedings aforesaid reviewed and reversed, the errors 
assigned corrected, the prayers of the bill granted, and such 
other and further relief granted as may be adopted to the nature 
of the case. 
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In conformity with the rule of this Court, it is here stated 
that the appellant is S. J. Oliver, and that the appellees, .J. Preston 
Hewitt, Helen H. Alexander, W. H. Boyd and Pauline H. Hewitt, 
are the only parties who will be affected by a reversal. 
13* *This pe1i'·ion is adopted as the opening brief, a copy 
hereof was delivered to counsel for the defendants on the 
13th day of June, 1949, and this petition with a transcript of 
the record and exhibits will be presented to Justice John W. 
Eggleston in his office in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, and 
petitioner's counsel desires to state orally the reasons for re-
viewing the decree complained of and for granting an appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. J. OLIVER, Appellant. 
By STANLEY J. BANGEL, 
302 Colony Theatre Building, 
Portsmouth, Virginia. 
The undersigned, an attorney duly qualified to practice in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in 
my opinion the decree complained of in the foregoing petition 
ought to be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. 
Received June 22, 1949. 
STANLEY J. BANGEL, 
802 Colony Theatre Building, 
Portsmouth, Va. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Oct. 5, 1949. Appeal awarded by the Court. Bond, $300. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
M.B.W. 
Pleas befo1·e the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth, 
at the courthouse thereof, on the 10th day of March, 1949. 
S. J. Oliver, Complainant, 
v. 
J. Preston Hewitt, Helen H. Alexander, and W. H. Boyd, and 
Pauline H. Hewitt, Defendants. 
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IN CHANCERY. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth, on the 24th 
day of December, 1948, came the complainant, by his attorney, 
and filed his memorandum, which is in the wordCJ and figures 
following, to-wit: 
To the Clerk of Said Court: 
Kindly issue process in the above entitled cause, returnable 
to the 1st January, 1949, rules. 
The addresses of the defendants are as follows: J Preston 
Hewitt-1913 Charleston Avenue, Portsmouth, Va. 
page 2 } Helen H. Alexander-1913 Cha.rleston Avenue, Port.s-
mouth, Va. W. H. Boyd-1900 Des Moines Avenue, 
Portsmouth, Va. Pauline H. Hewitt-1913 Charleston Avenue, 
Portsmouth, Va. 
A. A. BANGEL, p. q. 
BANGEL & BANGEL, p. q. 
CHANCERY SUMMONS. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia, 
To the Sergeant of the City of Portsmouth, greeting: 
You are hereby commanded to summon J. Preston Hewitt, 
Helen H. Alexander, W. H. Boyd and Pauline H. Hewitt, to 
appear at the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Portsmouth, at the Rules to be holden for the said Court, on .the 
1st Monday in January, 1949, to answer a Bill in Chancery, ex-
hibited against them in the said Court, by S. J. Oliver, and 
have then and there this summons. . . 
page 3 } Witness, Kenneth A. Bain, Jr., Clerk of said Court 
at his office, this 24th day of December, 1948, in the 
173rd year of the Commonwealth. 
KENNETH A. BAIN, JR., Clerk. 
By: DORIS V. MAJOR, D. C. 
The return of the Sergeant of the City of Portsmouth on the 
foregoing chancery summons is in the words and figures follow-
ing, to-wit: 
. Executed this 27th day of December, 1948, in the City of Ports-
mouth, Va., delivering copy of the within summons to J. Preston 
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Hewitt, Pauline H. Hewitt, W. H. Boyd, in person. R. E. 
Glover, City Serg't. by .J. M. Joyner, Deputy Serg't. 
Not finding Helen H. Alexander at her usual place of abode, 
I executed this 27th day of December, 1948, in the 
page 4 r City of Portsmouth, Va., by delivering a copy of the 
within summons to her brother, whom I found there 
a member of her family and over the age of sixteen years explain-
ing to him its purport. R. E. Glover, City Serg't. by J. M . 
. Joyner, Deputy Serg't. · 
Virginia: 
In the Clerk;s Office of the Circuit of the City_ of Portsmouth, 
at rules held in said Clerk's Office on the First Monday in Janu-
. ary, 1949, came the complainant, by counsel, and filed his bill 
of complaint, which is in the words and figures following to-wit: 
BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
To the Honorable Judge of Said Court: 
Your complainant respectfully represents unto the Court, as 
follows: 
1. That he owned, operated and controlled a grocery store, 
selling groceries and soft drinks, on Lincoln Street, Portsmouth, 
Virginia, on the 28th day of January, 1946, had been 
page 5 ~ for many years prior thereto, and still is the owner and 
operator of said grocery business and seller of soft drinks 
on Lincoln Street, in this City. 
2. That being owner of said grocery business and seller of 
soft drinks, and the fee simple owner of those certain lots, pieces 
or parcels of land, with their appurtenances, situate in the City 
of Portsmouth, Virginia, known, numbered and designated as 
Lots Nos. 1 and 2, in Block No. 30, on the plat of the Prentis 
Park Corporation, recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit 
Court of Norfolk County, Virginia, in Map Book 7, page 93, 
said lots, taken as a whole, being bounded and described as fol-
lows:. Beginning at the southwest intersection of Lincoln Street 
and Des Moines A venue; thence running south along the western 
side of Des Moines Avenue fifty-four and one-half (54;'2) feet; 
thence west, parallel with Lincoln Street, one hundred (100) 
feet; thence. north, parallel with Des Moines Avenue, fifty-four 
and one-half ( 54 7'2) feet to the southern side of Lincoln Street; 
thence east along the southern side of Lincoln Street one hundred 
(100) feet to the point of beginning. 
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That being the owner of the above described property, he 
refused to sell the said lots of land, unless the intended 
page 5 } purchaser or purchasers would buy with the covenant 
and condition attached that the buildings thereon or 
to be erected upon said lots would not be used in competition 
with his business; and would agree that a covenant or condition 
be included in the deed of bargain and sale "that the said parties 
of the second part (Grantees) nor their assigns, shall sell in any 
building to be. erected upon said lots any groceries or bottled 
drinks, except that bottled High Rock may be sold on said 
premises on any day after six o'clock P. M." 
3. That the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt and Helen H. Alex-
ander, being fully informed of the conditions under which your 
complainant would only sell, agreed to buy and did buy said 
property, with the following covenant and condition attached, 
and which was inserted in the deed in the following words: "The 
above conveyance is made upon the conditions that the said 
parties of the second part nor their assigns, shall sell in any build-
ing to be erected upon said lots any groceries or bottled drinks, 
except that bottled High Rock may be sold on said premises 
on any day after six o'clock P. M.," as will fully appear from 
the deed from complainant to the defendants, J. Preston 
page 7 } Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander, dated January 28, 
1946, and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Court of 
Hustings for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia, in Deed Book 
156, page 497. 
4. That the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt and Helen H. 
Alexander, by their deed dated July 7, 1947, and recorded in 
the Clerk's Office of the Court of Hustings in Deed Book 176, 
page 120, conveyed the property herein described to Pauline H. 
Hewitt; that the said Pauline H. Hewitt had knowledge of said 
covenant and condition before and at the time of receiving said 
deed. 
5. That the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt, Helen H. Alex-
ander and Pauline H. Hewitt, have with the aid of and in con-
spiracy with W. H. Boyd, wilfully broken said covenant and con-
dition, and they, under the style and trade name of Boyd's are .,. 
selling in said h.,uilding groceries frbm the early morning hours 
until the late evening hours, and are selling all kinds of soft drinks 
from the early morning hours, all during the day and before 6 
o'<~lock P. M., on every day, except Sundays; and has threat-
ened to continue said sales in violation of said covenant and con-
dition in said deed of bargain and sale from your complainant 
to the defendants, J. Preston Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander, 
and their assigns, Pauline H. Hewitt and W. H. Boyd. 
page 8 ~ 6. That the sale of groceries and soft drinks in viola-
tion of said covenant and condition in said deed, has 
done, is doing and will continue to do your complainant, irre-
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parable damages; and unfairly competing wit,h your complainant 
in his said business, have taken a large amount of business from 
complainant already, and will continue to do so, unless restrained. 
Your complainant therefore prays that the said J. Preston 
Hewitt, Helen H. Alexander, Pauline H. -Hewitt and W. H. Boyd 
may be made party defendants to this cause, enjoined from vio-
lating such- covenant and condition; that they may be enjoined 
and restrained from violating the said covenant or condition in 
the deed dated January 28, 1946, directly or indirectly, or aid-. 
ing in it.s. violation; that your complainant may be awarded 
damages for the injury already caused him by the illegal conduct 
and wrongful conduct of the defendants, and that such other relief 
ma,y be granted as may be adapted to the nature of the case. 
BANGEL & BANGLE, p. q. 
page 9 t Virginia: 
. S. J. OLIVER, 
By A. Z. B.ANGEL, p. q. 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of·Ports-
mouth, on the 27th day of December, 1948, came Pauline H. 
Hewitt, complainant, in a chancery cause under the style of 
Pauline H. Hewitt, against Solomon J. Oliver, Jr., and Leola. 
M. Oliver, and filed her memorandum, which is in the words 
and figures following, to-wit: 
To the Clerk of Court: 
· Please issue process in the above entitled styled suit return-
able to the next rules, 1949. 
PAULINE H. HEWITT, 
By EARLE A. CADMUS, Counsel. 
EARLE A. CADMUS, p. q. 
Defendants reside: 
1912 Lincoln St., 
Portsmouth, Va. 
CHANCERY SUMMONS .. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia, 
To the Sergeant of the City of Portsmouth, Greeting: 
You are hereby commanded to summon Solomon J. Oliver, 
Jr., and Leola M. Oliver, to appear at the Clerk's Office of the 
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Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth, at the Rules 
page 10 ~ t.o be holden for the said Court, on the 1st Monday in 
January, 1949, to answer a Bill in Chanpery, exhibited 
against them in the said Court, by Pauline H. Hewitt and have 
then and there this summons. 
Witness, Kenneth A. Bain, Jr., Clerk of said Court, at his 
office this 27th day of December, 1948, in the 173rd year of 
the Commonwealth. 
KENNETH A. BAlN, JR., Clerk. 
By: DORIS V. MAJOR, D. C. 
The return of the Sergeant of the City of Portsmouth on the 
foregoing chancery summons is in the words and figures follow-
ing, to-wit: 
Executed this 27th day of December, 1948, in the City of 
Portsmouth, Va., delivering copy of the within summons to 
Solomon J. Oliver, Jr., in person. R. E. Glover, City Serg't. 
by J. M. Joyner, Deputy Serg't. 
Not finding Leola M. Oliver at her usual place 
page 11 ~ of abode, I executed this 27th day of December, 1948, 
in the City of Portsmouth, Va., by delivering a copy 
of the within summons to S. J. Oliver, Jr., her husband, whom 
I found there a member of her family and over the age of six-
teen years explaining to him its purport. R. E. Glover, City 
Serg't. by J. M. Joyner, Deputy Scrg't. 
Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Ports-
mouth, at rules held in said Clerk's Office on the First Monday 
in January, 1949, came the complainant., by counsel, and filed 
her bill of complaint, which is in the words and figures following, 
to-wit: 
To the Honorable Floyd E. Kellam, Judge of said Court: 
Your complainant, Pauline H. Hewitt, respectfully repre-
sents unto Your Honor the following: 
FIRST: That on the 7th day of July, 1947, she purchased 
certain real estate in the City of Portsmouth from J. Preston 
Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander, which property is located in 
the City of Portsmol.lth, a description of which is as fol-
lows: 
page 12 ~ Those certain lots, pieces, or parcels of land, with 
their appurtenances, situate in the City of Portsmouth, 
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Virginia, known, numbered and designated as Lots Numbers 
one (1) and Two (2), in Block Number Thirty (30), on the plat 
of the Prentis Park Corporation, recorded in the Clerk's Office 
of the Circuit Court of Norfolk County, Virginia, in Map Book 7, 
page 93, said two lots, taken as a whole, being bounded and de-
scribed as follows: Beginning at the southwest intersection of 
Lincoln Street and Des Moines Avenue; thence, running south 
along the western side of Des Moines Avenue fifty-four and one-
half (54%) feet; thence west, parallel with Lincoln Street, one 
hundred (100) feet; thence north, parallel with Des Moines 
A venue, fifty-four and one-half (54Y2) feet to the southern side 
of Lincoln . Street; and thence east along the southern side of 
Lincoln Street, one hundred (100) feet to the point of beginning. 
SECOND:· . That the above described premises were originally 
sold by Solomon J. Oliver by Bargain & Sale Deed to J. Preston 
Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander, by deed dated the 28th day of 
January, 1946; that in the said conveyance there was this clause 
inserted in the deed: 
"The above conveyance is made upon the condition that 
said parties of the second part nor their assigns, shall 
page 13 } sell in any building to be erected upon said lots any 
groceries or bottled drinks, except that Bottled High 
Rork may be sold on said premises on any day after six o'clock 
P. M. 
THREE: That in the deed to the complainant from J. 
Preston Hewitt and Helen H .. Alexander this clause was not in-
serted. 
FOURTH: Your complainant alleges that she has not vio~ 
lated any condition and believes that the said condition is a re~ 
straint upon free alienation. 
Wherefore, your complainant prays that as to the real estate1 
that this bill be treated as a bill of quia timet, and that her title 
to the said real estate be herein established. . 
Whereupon your complainant is remediless save in a court of 
equity wJiere all such matters are alone properly cognizable, and 
your .complainant prays that proper process issue; that the said 
Solomon J. Oliver, Jr., and Leola ·M. Oliver be made parties .~o 
this bill and be required to answer the·same, but not under oath, 
the oath being hereby waived; and that a declaratory decree 
may be entered, fixing and determining the status of the said 
complainant in accordance with the Virginia law, and 
page 14 f that the same decree be established and confirm the 
said title of the complainant in and to the said real 
estate hereinbeforc described; that all' proper orders may be 
entered; that the said condition l;>e declared null and void as 
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being a personal covenant only, and not a covenant running with 
the land; and that she be given all such other and further relief 
as the nature of her case may require, or to equity may seem meet, 
and this she will ever pray, etc. 
PAULINE H. HEWITT. 
By EARL A. CADMUS, Counsel. 
And at another day, to-wit: At the Circuit Court of the City 
of Portsmouth, held on the 24th day of January, 1949. 
This day came all the parties in the above styled suits, by 
counsel, and upon their motion, with the consent of the Court, 
the said suits are consolidated, and are to be tried together 
And the Court, with the consent of all the parties, set these 
causes down for trial ore tenus for February 9, 1949, at 10:30 
A.M. 
page 15 ~ Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Ports-
mouth, on the 2nd day of March, 1949, came the complainant, 
by counsel, and filed his notice that he would apply for permission 
to introduce evidence before any decree is entered, which is in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
J. Preston Hewitt, Helen H. Alexander, W. H. Boyd and 
Pauline H. Hewitt: 
You are hereby notified that I shall on the 2nd day of March, 
1949, at 10:00 A. M., move the Honorable Judge of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Portsmouth to reconsider my motion to 
permit me to introduce evidence before any decree in this matter 
be entered, to prove that the defendants are selling groceries and 
soft drinks in violation of the covenant which is the subject 
matter of this suit. 
Service Accepted: 
EARL A. CADMUS 
SOLOMON J. OLIVER, JR., 
By STANLEY J. BANGEL, p. q. 
Attorney for the Defendants. 
page 16 r Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of Ports .. 
mouth, on the 2nd day of March, 1949, came the complainant, 
• 
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by counsel, and filed his motion, which was rejected for not hav-
ing been made in time and was not supported by the evidence 
which is in the words anct figures followmg, to-w1f.: 
I move that Your Honor ·permit Mr. Oliver, the ·complainant, 
to introduce evidence before any decree be entered in this cause 
to prove _that the defendants a:e sellin roceries and soft drinks 
1S 
SUI • 
This motion is made on the grounds that at the hearing of 
this matter is was stated to the Court by the attorney for the 
defendants that the sole question before the Court was one of 
law arid that there was no need to put on any evidence. He 
stated that if the restriction was a personal covenant and did not 
run with· the land the injunction should be denied; that if it was 
a real c9venant, an injunction would lie. I agreed with him 
that the sole issue was a question of law and that no evidence 
was necessary and that the covenant was a personal covenant, 
but that if the defendant, Pauline Hewitt took the property 
havin · e covenant then equity would rant an in-
junction. Tlie . w 
page 17 } ~9sion, at the issue was solel one of law 
therefore even 
court to prove tha e defendants were selling groceries and 
soft drinks in violation of the covenant, I did not introduce that 
evidence, believing that it was not in issue but admitted. 
Since this is an equity proceedings and the main purpose of 
equity is to do justice, not to take advantage of an error in judg-
ment, and before any decree in this matter be entered, I respect-
fully move that I be permitted to introduce this evidence. The 
evidence does not in any way affect the Court's immediate de-
~~- . 
I am fully aware that this cause came to be heard on the 9th 
day of February, 1949, and that after argument of counsel, 
Your Honor desired to take this suit under advisement and told 
counsel that at any time that they found additional authorities 
that they could submit them to him and he would take them into 
considera tiori·. . 
~\Her some time, on the ........ day of ............ , 1949, 1 
Your Honor told counsel that he was of the opinion that the 
covenant which is the subject of this suit was valid personal 
covenant, but that it was not enforceable against 
page 18 } · Hewitt even thou h she had knowled e of this 
covenant. Your onor sa are a 
decree and presen 1 o 1m to e entered. This decree has no . 
been entered, and I respectfully submit that the evidence that r--
desire to produce to the Court does not in any way affect the 
inµnediate decision of the Court and ask that I be perroitted ta 
proouce it. 
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The objection to t.he foregoing rejected motion presented by 
counsel for the defendant, Pauline H. Hewitt, is in the words 
and figures, following, to-wit: 
Counsel for Mrs. Pauline Hewitt objects to the motion made 
by counsel for S. J. Oliver on the grounds that these two causes 
were heard together by order entered consolidating the two 
causes on the 9th day of February, 1949; that on the 18th day of 
February, 1949, the Court notified both counsel for S. J. Oliver 
and Mrs. Hewitt that the injunction would be denied and that 
the covenant was a personal covenant and did not run with 
the land and did not bind Mrs. Hewitt or her assigns; counsel 
for Mrs. Pauline Hewitt then prepared a decree in 
page 19 ~ accordance with the Court's decision, and gave a copy 
of it to the attorney for Mr. Oliver; subsequently, on 
the 2nd day of March, 1949, both attorneys met with Court to 
have the decree entered, and then after considerable discussion 
counsel for Mr. Oliver asked to be allowed to introduce other 
evidence; counsel for Mrs. Hewitt objected to this on the grounds 
that the cause was disposed of during the February term of Court 
and was only awaiting the formal entry of the decree; counsel for 
Mr. Oliver had ample opportunity to introduce any evidence 
that he wished to at the time of the trial on February 9th, and 
and readily agreed that the sole question of the case was one of 
law, and I submit that he is now too late, and for the further rea-
son he readily admits in his motion that the taking of additional 
evidence would not change the immediate result of this cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL A. CADMUS, 
Counsel for Mrs. Pauline Hewitt. 
page 20 } The evidence introduced at hearing of this cause, 
is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case, had on the 
9th day of February, 1949, the following evidence was intro-
duced: 
That S. J. Oliver, who owns a grocery store at 1912 Lincoln 
St., Portsmouth, Virginia, testified that he owns and operates a 
grocery store and had for some years. He testified that he owned 
lots Nos. 1 and 2 in Block 30, on the plat of the Prentis Park Cor-
poration, which said land was located on the southwest inter-
section of Des Moines and Lincoln Streets; that he sold the said 
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land on the 28th day of January, 1946, to J. Preston Hewitt 
and Helen II. Alexander. In the sale of this property to J. 
Preston Hewitt and Helen H .. Alexander there was inserted this 
language: "The above conveyance is made upon the condition 
that said parties of the second part, nor their assigns, shall sell 
in any building to be erected upon said lots, any groceries or 
bottled drink~, except that bottled High Rock may be sold on 
said premises, on any da.y after six o'clock P. M." The deed 
conveying this property was offered as Exhibit "A." 
Mrs. Pauline H. Hewitt, who was put on the witness stand 
as an adverse witness for S. J. Oliver, testified that 
page 21 } she ·purchased the above described property from J. 
Preston Hewitt and Helen Alexander by deed dated 
the 7th day of July, 1947, and that in the deed to her the above 
covenant was not inserted, and which said deed was offered and 
introduced in evidence by counsel for Mrs. Pauline H. Hewitt, 
and marked as defendant's "Exhibit No. 1." The evidence 
and pleadings disclosed that Pauline H. Hewitt was not the 
opera.tor of said store, and that same was leased to ·w. H. Boyd, 
and was employed at the Norfolk Navy Yard, and that she is 
the wife of J. Preston Hewitt. 
No other evidence was offered by counsel for either of the 
said parties and the Court, on the 18th day of February, 1049, 
notified both counsel for the above parties that the covenant was 
personal and did not run with the land, and wa.s therefore, not 
binding upon Mrs. Pauline H. Hewitt. Subsequently 1 on the 
2nd day of March, 1949, counsel for S. J. Oliver objected to the 
decree which was prepared by counsel for Mrs. Pauline H. Hewitt. 
At this time counsel for Mr. Oliver then asked that. he be allowed 
to take additional evidence, but the Court refused to again re-
open the case. 
I, Floyd E. Kellam, Judge of the Circuit Court. of the City 
of Portsmouth, Virginia, do hereby certify that the 
page 22 } foregoing is a true and correct narrative statement 
of the testimony and proceedings of the cases of Solo-
mon J. Oliver, Jr., v. J. Preston Hewitt., Helen H. Alexander, 
W. H. Boyd and Pauline H. Hewitt, and Pauline H. Hewitt 
v. S. J. Oliver, which two cases were consolidated together by 
order of Court, and tried in said Court on the 9th day of February, 
1949, and included all the testimony offered. I further certify 
that the exhibit offered in evidence as described by the foregoing 
record, and designated plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and defendant's 
Exhibit "1," are all the exhibits offered on said trial and said 
original exhibit has been initialed by me for the purpose of 
identification. I further certify that said transcript was pre-
sented to me for certification within sixty days of the final order 
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in said cause and that the attorney for the defendants had rea- -
sonable notice in writing of the time and place at which the same 
would be tendered for certification. 
Given under my hand this 2nd day of April, 1949. 
F. E. KELLAM, Judge. 
page 23 ~ And at this day, to-wit: At the Circuit Court of the 
1949. 
City of Portsmouth, held on the 10th day of March, 
This cause, by consent of all parties, entered of record on the 
second day of January, 1949, was consolidated with the Chancery 
Suit of Pauline H. Hewitt v. Solomon J. Oliver, ,Jr., et al., and 
heard together ore tenus, on the 9th day of February, 1940 
and was argued by counsel: It appearing to the Court that the 
Bill of Solomon ,J. Oliver, Jr., v. J. Preston Hewitt, et als., pray-
ing for an injunction, is without evidence to support the bill, 
the same is dismissed, and it appearing further to the Court 
from the deed of Solomon J. Oliver, Jr., and wife to J. Preston 
Hewitt and Helen H. Alexander, dated the 28th day of January, 
1946, the following provision, was plead in said deed: "The 
above conveyanc~ is made upon the condition that said parties 
of the second part, nor their assigns, shall sell in any building 
to be erected upon said lots, any groceries or bottled drinks, ex-
cept that bottled High Rock may be sold on said premises, on 
any day after six o'clock P. M." 
It further appearing that J. Preston Hewitt, Helen H. Alex-
ander and Kenneth C. Alexander, her husband, by deed dated 
the 7th day of July, 1947, conveyed the same prop-
page 24 ~ erty to Pauline H. Hewitt, but there was no provision 
in this deed limiting the sale of groceries or soft drinks 
on the property, as in the deed from Oliver and wife to J. Preston 
Hewitt, et al., (above refused to) and the Court is of the opinion 
that since there is no provision or condition in the deed from J. 
Preston Hewitt, et als., to Pauline H. Hewitt, limiting the sale 
of groceries or soft drinks, the condition or covenant does not 
run with the land, but is a personal covenant and doth so decide. 
It further appearing that the Court advised counsel for all 
parties of its decision on the 18th day of February, 1949, and on 
the second day of March, 1949, counsel for Pauline H. Hewitt 
presented to the Court proposed decree to be entered in this 
cause, which was objected to by counsel for Solomon J. Oliver, 
Jr., and at that time, made motion that he be permitted to in-
\ 
traduce additional evidence to show that the defendants were 
selling groceries and soft drinks, which motion the Court re-
jected and refused to re-open the case, and Solomon J. Oliver, Jr., 
by counsel excepted. 
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The notice of the plaintiff, Solomon J. Oliver, Jr., that he would 
present the testimony to the court and apply for a transcript of 
the record, is in the words and figures, following, to-wit: 
page 25 } Mr. Earl A. Cadmus 
Attorney for the Defendants 
New Kirn Building 
Portsmouth, Ya. 
Take notice that on the 2nd day of April, 1949, the under-
signed will present to the Honorable Floyd E. Kellam, Judge of 
the Cireuit Court of the City of Portsmouth, Virginia, at the 
Courthouse thereof, a narrative report of the testimony and other 
proceedings of the trial of the above entitled case for certifica-
tion by said Judge, and will on the 2nd day of April, 1949, make 
application to the Clerk of Said Court for a transcript of the record 
in said case for the purpose of presenting the same to the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, with a petition for a writ of 
error and S'lLpersedeas to the final judgment of the Trial Court 
in said case. 
SOLOMON tl, OLIVER, JR., 
By STANLEY J. BANGEL, Counsel. 
Legal Service of the above notice is hereby accepted this 1st 
day of April, 1949. 
page 26 } State of Virginia: 
EARL A. CADl\tIDS, 
Attorney for the Defendants. 
City of Portsmouth, to .. wit: 
I, Kenneth A. Bain, J1•., Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Portsmouth, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true transcript of the record in the foregoing cause; 
and I further certify that the notice required by Section 6339 of 
the Code of 1919, was duly given in accordance with said section. 
Given under my hand this 30th day of April, 1949. 
KENNETH A. BAIN, JR., Clerk. 
By: DORIS V. MAJOR, D. C. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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